

nuclear family.¹⁰⁰ Specifically, Murdock mentioned in this regard widespread poverty which inhibits wife purchase, Christian religious principles that forbid polygyny, the concept of private property and its attendant independence, and a shift of inheritance customs from primogeniture to division among a number of heirs.¹⁰¹ Nearly every one of these modifications and influences has been at work among the Mapuche, with the consequence that their clan system, if they actually had one, has been destroyed; their unilocal, patrilocal household units are no longer maintained; levirate, sororate, and other polygynous arrangements are practically nonexistent; cross-cousin marriage has become a rarity; and yet the old Omaha terminology persists, having survived in spite of drastic changes of marriage, descent, and residence practices. 174 511 174

UNILocal HOUSEHOLDS AND POLITICAL UNITS

At no time in their recorded history do the Araucanians seem to have had anything like a formal and comprehensive political structure. When they were fighting major campaigns, they elected supreme commanders and lesser officers at public assemblies of adult males. The orders of these leaders were obeyed throughout the range of the entire tribe. Apparently, such large-scale organization was regarded as an emergency measure for, with the coming of peace, administrative controls reverted to the heads of small local units.¹⁰² Never was there a continuously functioning tribal authority that had jurisdiction in times of peace, nor is there any record of true legislating bodies or procedures. Such "laws" as existed were not precisely formulated, and amounted to no more than traditional usages. Natives refer to them as *admapu* ("customs of the land"¹⁰³) or as *piam* ("it is said"¹⁰⁴) in the sense of sayings handed down by the ancestors. Even the most widely distributed of these beliefs and practices, 621 [701] 621 626

¹⁰⁰ Murdock, 1949, p. 203.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 200-4.

¹⁰² See the treatment of this topic in Cooper, 1946, p. 714.

¹⁰³ Molina, 1808, II: 56; Augusta, 1916, I: 1.

¹⁰⁴ Augusta, 1916, I: 178.

near the snow land, was the region of the lower Andes, and *Pire-mapu*, snow land. 131
the upper ranges.

The error was fallen into of considering these as political divisions, instead of 631
geographical; a mistake in which many later writers have continued. As a matter
of fact there was no political organisation, as we understand the term, and the
Araucanos recognised no supreme chief, save only in times of great national peril,
and then only in a military sense, and by public election. The danger over, they
returned to their former customs, the functions of the chief ceasing from the
moment the army was disbanded.

The basis of their social and political life is the family, which develops into a 619
clan, and afterwards a tribe, absolutely independent one from the other. The clan 621
itself was called *lov*, the village occupied by it *rehue*, the group of villages inhabited [594]
by the tribe *ailla-rehue*, literally nine villages.

The clan or *lov* was governed by the head of the family or *ulmen*, the tribe by
the hereditary descendant of the founder or *apo-ulmen*, a contraction of *mapu-ulmen*,
chief of the land.

Their villages were small, the third generation generally leaving them to form 621
another, at a short distance away.

The authority of these chiefs descended from father to eldest son, save in 622
the case of physical or mental incapability, when a new chief is chosen, generally
another son, brother, or near relative of the deceased.

The authority of these *ulmens* is, however, little more than nominal, and is
confined almost exclusively to the direction of their feasts and ceremonies, and in
a lesser degree to the political economy of the group.

All important matters are treated in common council by the adult males, the [623]
chief presiding at the meeting. No tribute is paid him, neither is he exempt from
sharing the daily tasks of the clan, although in a general way he assumes the
management.

Both the *ulmens* and *apo-ulmens* are known under the common title of *toqui*,
from the stone axe worn round their necks, which is a symbol of their authority and
which bears that name. The Spaniards following the custom prevalent through the
whole of America gave them the generic name of *cacique*.

In time of national warfare, the tribes of the different zones or *mapu*, also 619
called *extramapu*, united under a general or war chief called *lonco*. This post was 701
usually hereditary during the time of the Spanish wars, although in the beginning
the occupant was elected from among the most famous warriors by popular
vote.

When the Araucanos began to adopt a more sedentary life, it became necessary 627
to establish more firmly their *admapu* (customs of the land), or code of laws. Their
quarrels were formerly settled by an appeal to arms; now however the *ulmen* called
together the elders of the clan and they deliberated on the evidence given, and
imposed punishment for the crime committed. It was not considered necessary to
hear the offender.

721 not, however, to extend territory. Most of our information, however, concerns warfare as carried on between the *Araucanians* and the Spaniards.

[701] Preparation for war.—The first step toward deciding upon war was usually the sending, by a headman or group, of a messenger to headmen and groups desired as confederates. The messenger carried an arrow tied with a red string, symbolic of blood, or, if hostilities had already begun, with the finger of a slain enemy attached to the arrow. He also carried a quipu for each headman or group, to indicate the day of assembly. When all had assembled on the appointed day, a black llama was killed and the arrows and spears were dipped in or anointed with the animal's blood, while all of the headmen ate a bit of the heart of the animal as a pledge of unified purpose. The war decision was made by general agreement. A leader was chosen by preference from among the existing headmen or prominent warriors. His authority was considerable but lasted only so long as war lasted. His mark of office was the *toki*, the name by which he himself was called. In the later 18th century, at least, the *toki-ax* was kept in hiding during peacetime and brought out in time of war. The fighting men before [834] going to war shaved their heads, leaving only a circle of hair, abstained from sex relations, and ate and drank sparingly for 8 days before starting out.

725 Tactics and weapons.—As early as 1568, the *Araucanians* had begun to use cavalry in battle on a fairly large scale; later, they used it much more frequently. In battle formation, the infantry advanced in the center and the cavalry on the wings. The use of advance guards, sentinels at night, trenches protected with thorn branches, pitfalls and ditches with sharp stakes at the bottom, spies and fifth-column work, and log forts and palisades was common. Each warrior carried with him a small bag of parched meal which, with salt and *aji*, constituted his food. A common war cry was to strike the open mouth rhythmically with the palm of the hand while shouting and to repeat this four times (Moesbach, 1936, p. 126).

411 Infantry weapons were chiefly the following: Bows and arrows, spears, clubs, and slings. The spears were 20, 30, or more palms long (circa 14 to 20 feet), with fire-hardened or stone points. Spears were sometimes thrown as *ja'elins* (Frézier, 1716, p. 58; cf. "gorguz," in Ercilla, canto 25, 1910, p. 415, and Oña, canto 6, 1917, p. 225). The bow was short, according to González de Nájera (1889, p. 95, 5 palmos) with sinew string; the arrows, according to González de Nájera (*ibid.*, pp. 95-96), about 2½ palmos long, of cane, usually with bone heads, not poisoned but lightly attached to the shaft and apt to come off in the wound, were carried in a quiver. The clubs were of two kinds, a very long two-handed elbow club of heavy wood, about 15 palmos long, according to González de Nájera (1889, p. 96); and another type of

ARAUCANIAN CULTURAL CHANGE

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themselves outmanned and outmaneuvered, and so were frequently forced to flee 725 for their lives, leaving baggage trains in the hands of the enemy.²⁰

It was military planning of this kind that led to the capture and death of 725 Valdivia. Historians generally recognize the death trap into which he fell as the 701 handiwork of Lautaro, the most famous ex-groom in all history. Lautaro has since become one of Chile's great national heroes, symbolizing all that was best in Araucanian culture. Be that as it may, there is considerable reason to believe that Lautaro hailed from the vicinity of Santiago, and was therefore an Araucanian by nothing more than association.²¹ His relations with the Araucanians are not clear historically beyond the fact that he led their resistance, aided by other chiefs, until his death in 1557. He was extremely well versed in military strategy, and his deployment of squadrons in place of mass attack and the use of encirclement were valued contributions to Araucanian knowledge, but the fact that many other military techniques were developed after he had passed from the scene would indicate that there were countless Araucanians of equal ability.

Generally speaking, the Araucanians retained their own weapons in the war 725 against the Spanish. Bows and arrows, long lances, spears, long clubs with weighted heads, and slings were the weapons most often used.²² Strategy was much more [411]

20 For typical accounts see Marmolejo, pp. 35ff., 85, 101, 171-176, 186-187. In the matter of Indian strategy and resistance the Spaniards could not see the forest for the trees. They laid responsibility for their failures on everything but the Indians. A widely prevalent idea, as expressed by Martín Ruiz de Gamboa (Gay, II, p. 123), held that more polished peninsular gentlemen were needed to fight the Indians, ignorant *croles* being unfit for the task. Discrimination against *croles* was a constant source of dissension in Spanish ranks. In 1557, García Hurtado de Mendoza arrived in Chile as Governor with many peninsulars in his train. The abandon with which he handed out *encomiendas* to his peninsular friends enraged the luckless *croles*. In his reply to their complaints he suggested that no more than a handful of the Chileans knew the identity of their fathers, and then insultingly inquired, "En qué se andan aquí estos hijos de putas?" (Marmolejo, p. 80). Nájera (pp. 36-37) took a more realistic view. He stated that *croles* were born in war and carried the brunt of the fighting, and did it well. Because the chroniclers ignored their deeds, he added, they were unappreciated in Spain. He considered the disparity between *crole* and peninsular to be utterly inane.

21 Marmolejo simply states that among those who plotted Valdivia's downfall was a *yancona* named Alonso, who had been Valdivia's servant (p. 36). This brief notice is the only valid evidence of Lautaro's origin. Among the chroniclers in Chile the term *yancona* invariably meant a friendly and allied Indian from the north. Chilean historians are prone to begin with the premise that he was an Araucanian, but have difficulty in explaining how he could have become an *españolado* in the brief period between Valdivia's first contact with the Araucanians and his death. It seems much more likely that Lautaro was taken by Valdivia in Santiago when he was a boy. See Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna, *Lautaro* (Santiago, 1876) for the standard nationalistic version.

22 Olaverrié, pp. 33-34; Nájera, pp. 95-98. For a plausible account of Araucanian reaction to the Spanish danger after 1550 see Ricardo Latcham, "La capacidad guerrera de los Araucanos: sus armas y métodos militares" (*Revista Chilena de Historia y Geografía*, vol. 15, no. 19, 1915, pp. 122-193). While this study is valuable for purely military affairs, it does not attempt to 114

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Mapuche

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MAPUCHE SOCIAL STRUCTURE

613 have created the multil lineage community as it is known today. The
621 story of this creation may be told quite simply.

178 After 1884 Chilean surveyors made the rounds in the indigenous
648 zone for the purpose of mapping reservations and registering the in-
habitants thereof. The Indians were asked who was their chief (ca-
[622] cique), and they frequently gave their answer in the politico-military
context suggested by the question. In short, the person designated as
chief, rather than *lonko* (head of kinship group), had usually held
[701] some minor position of military leadership during the recent rebel-
lion, leadership over a larger-than-kinship group. This latter group
was then registered as a single reservation community. This did not
occur in all cases, but the registry records indicate that it occurred
in most cases. Curiously, the Chilean government was instrumental
in establishing multikinship communities which had their founda-
tion in the war years — the very thing the reservation system was
designed to quash.

[166] During the twenty-eight years it took before all reservations were
mapped and registered, there was some mobility among that segment
of the Mapuche population which had not been registered on any
reservation or not registered to their satisfaction. Consequently small
groups moved from place to place within the indigenous zone look-
[622] ing for more adequate living conditions, and any number of these
obtained permission from chiefs to settle near them on unregistered
land. When the time came for mapping and census taking, these
remnant groups were incorporated in the newly formed reservation
community.

613 The descendants of the original chief have come to form the dom-
621 inant lineage on these multil lineage reservations, descendants of un-
178 related kingroups now constituting subordinate lineages. Dominant
lineages are dominant in at least two senses — size and power. The
way they compare to the subordinate lineages may be seen by refer-
ring to Diagram I. They are quite broad at the base, have undergone
significant sublineation, and, of course, trace descent to the original
title holder of the reservation. This connection has worked to their
advantage in acquiring the best land, their membership in the politi-
cally dominant group facilitating their claims to land during the
crucial, early phase of reservation life when the allocation of land was
[622] in the hands of the chief. Members of the subordinate lineages were
able to live on the reservation only by sufferance of the chief, at least
[167] in the early years of the reservation system. Their unfavorable posi-

* [See Cat. 116, p. 93 -- ANALYST]

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Mapuche

Chilean citizens, though, the Mapuche also have a series of rights and obligations irrespective of reservation status which brings them under the jurisdiction of national courts, the authority of which is backed by the Chilean police force, military organization, and penal institutions. Nevertheless, the question of land rights (corporate vs. severalty status) is central to Mapuche political organization. It is largely as title holder of reservation land that the chief enjoys political leadership. It is membership in a reservation community that conditions the individual's political interests and goals. The eventual disposition of reservation land continues to be the primary issue around which Mapuche-Chilean relationships center in the political sphere of social action. The preamble to the contemporary condition may be stated in historical terms.

For more than 300 years after the Spanish invasion of Chile the Mapuche maintained considerable autonomy over the region south of the Bío Bío River. Horacio Lara (1889:241) expressed himself on this matter in the following words: "La Araucanía seguía prestandose a la faz del mundo como una sección territorial independiente de nuestra República, con sus costumbres y su independencia propia. . . ." But toward the end of the colonial era a series of forts and towns was re-established south of the Bío Bío — Los Angeles, Nacimiento, Antuco, and Santa Barbara were founded between 1742 and 1758. South of the Mapuche stronghold, Osorno, San Pablo, and Río Bueno were established with the effect of delimiting the southern extension of Mapuche-held territory. These towns did not serve as jumping-off points for immediate settler penetration of the Indian zone, however.

While little is really known about the details of Mapuche politico-military organization during most of this long era, the fact that they were able to resist white settlement of their heartland suggests an organization that could be called into play when the occasion demanded. It must not be overlooked, though, that they had the advantage of sheer weight of numbers, which, perhaps more than tactical maneuvers and organizational ability, accounts for their successful resistance. Also, because of a lack of centralized political authority, the Spaniards and later the Chileans were forced to conquer one small residential aggregate after another, the defeat of one such group not entailing the submission of the rest. In any case, the long-range successes of the Mapuche were always at the expense of

11:Faron E-5 (1952-1954)1961 SG4 Araucanians SG4
Mapuche

THE RESERVATION AS A POLITICAL UNIT

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Decisions regarding peacetime affairs and warlike undertakings were usually made in conferences of the responsible men and subheads at the house or meeting-ground of the head or "chief" after free expression of views and by common agreement. There was a certain loose hierarchy of honor and status (rather than authority proper) embracing higher and lower heads and "chiefs" — which brings us to the less clear features of the . . . socio-political structure [715]. ⁶⁴² [001]

In the course of time, particularly after the beginning of the 19th century, a certain increase in the executive and judicial power and authority accrued to peacetime headmen . . . and the earlier atomistic peacetime political structure assumed somewhat greater unity, cohesion, and hierarchization. But the basic democratic forms and functions persisted largely intact [716]. ⁶²²

In writing of law and legal procedure, Cooper has this to say: ⁶⁸ ⁶⁷³

The chief crimes recognized were adultery and wife-stealing, murder, theft, homicidal sorcery, and treason. The offended party and his kin dealt with the offender; in earlier times headmen and other caciques had little or no authority to try cases or to pronounce judgment. Adultery, murder, and sorcery were punishable by death, and sometimes were actually so punished; but more commonly, in cases of adultery and murder, composition was resorted to, with payment of strings of llankas . . . [716]. ⁶²⁷ [622]

Today, certain behavior is defined as extralegal by Chilean standards, serious departures from national law being handled by Chilean institutions empowered to enforce law and order. The Mapuche go to law for the settlement of disputes involving certain crimes and torts, but within the reservation community traditional sanctions deal effectively with other antisocial acts of a different nature. Most important among these are the ones which involve sorcery and which the Chilean courts usually refuse to consider seriously. Ostracism, ridicule, and the threat of sorcery continue as sanctions on most if not all reservations and larger communities. In certain instances, therefore, the Mapuche "take the law into their own hands," applying traditional moral principles in the ordering of social action. But matters involving property and personal rights not capable of being dealt with by traditional means are ultimately resolvable by recourse to the Chilean system of courts and law-enforcement agencies. ⁶⁹² [48] ⁶⁸³ [81]

MAPUCHE: "PEOPLE OF THE LAND"

After the declaration of Chilean independence in 1810, the new national government assumed responsibility for colonizing the Mapuche stronghold south of the Bío Bío River. In general, the republican government's efforts followed the pattern established during the ¹⁷⁵ ⁶⁴⁸ ⁴²³

175 and political organization of the reservation Mapuche was under-
648 going significant change, and a new social stability was achieved
621 under the reservation chief.

CHIEFTAINSHIP

178 It will be remembered that in time of peace the prerreservation
622 Mapuche lived in numerous autonomous groups under the leadership
648 of a kinship elder, the *lonko*, and that the authority of the *lonko* was
[613] minimal and subject to rather easy circumvention. In the nineteenth
[701] century there seems to have occurred a crystallization of military
powers in the hands of *lonkos* who were able to secure a following
during time of hostility. But military defeat or even dissension with-
in the group sufficed to negate the *lonko*'s authority, with the result
that segments of residential groups tended to fragment off. There was
[166] considerable physical mobility and continual population flux which
operated to modify the composition of Mapuche society at the local-
group level.

[701] To a large extent there was a transfer of military-like authority
to the new peacetime office of chief. Ultimately, cessation of hostili-
ties contributed to the waning of the chief's military power, but this
development was in fact delayed by the reservation system, which
vested the chief with important political status in dealing with
Chilean governmental agencies.

[186] There was a carry-over of wartime sentiment manifest in pride of
"race," of war exploits, of traditional cultural values, and the demon-
stration of a great deal of hostility and distrust against whites. Al-
though the Chilean government kept the Mapuche under surveillance
through its army and police force, the internal operation of the reser-
vation communities was left in the hands of the Mapuche themselves.
It seems that governmental agencies were not large enough or power-
ful enough at this time to enforce strict conformance to Chilean law
throughout the extensive indigenous zone. This left great authority
in the hands of the chiefs, who profited from anti-Chilean feelings
among their people. The authority of the chiefs has diminished in
the area of Mapuche-white relationships for a number of reasons,
not least of which are the lessening of feelings of hostility toward the
whites and the development of divergent economic interests among
the reservation population.

178 When land became limited and title to it vested in the chief and
433 hedged in by governmental restrictions, the chief controlled the basic

11: Faron E-5 (1952-1954) 1961 SG4 Araucanians SG4
Mapuche

the Chileans and the Mapuche were for a long time deterrents to the loss of the chief's authority over his reservation group. To a certain extent this may be said to be operative still in times of crisis.

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In parts of Araucanía where there is less pressure on land and where *división* is not a subject which is hotly contended among the reservation population, chieftainship is noticeably stronger in the economic sphere. Communal labor is more frequent and carried out on a larger scale. Communal land is used for grazing and gathering wood and is still under the jurisdiction of the chief. If an individual wishes to clear communal woodland for the purpose of farming it, permission has to be granted. In these matters there is an informal conclave of elders who make the decisions, but the chief is their spokesman and the official arbiter. The individual resident has a recognized right to continue his petition in the hope of swaying the leader's opinions by showing cause.

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[423]

[623]

Significant modifications have taken place in Mapuche social structure since the imposition of a Chilean administrative system. Reservation social structure is qualitatively different from that of pre-reservation times. Before the period of peaceful reservation living, sociopolitical units fluctuated or changed in size. Since the imposition of reservation restrictions a greater population stability has come about, communities made up of unrelated kingroups have evolved, and reservation leadership has acquired political aspects over and above kinship allegiance.

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Stated differently, the characteristic prereservation social unit was a kinship rather than a political group. For the most part it was a small, autonomous domestic unit. In establishing reservations the Chilean government attempted to follow this traditional social alignment. We have seen, however, that reservations were composed of dominant kingroups and one or more remnant groups of nonrelatives. This situation really approximated the Mapuche wartime organization, rather than the normally highly segmentary structure characterized by weak leadership in the hands of a *lonko*. So today's reservations continue to comprise a congeries of small communities which, in the framework of colonial administration, are essentially autonomous political groups with respect to one another.

[001]

[642]

Although the Chilean government legislates with regard to all reservations as a totality, it deals in most matters under the law with individual reservations, for example when a petition for *división* is made, or with individual persons, such as when credit is sought by

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